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3Abstract
We review a class of adverse environmental externalities that accompany consumption
and procreation. We also identify externalities that are traceable to socially embedded
preferences for family size. Those preference structures can give rise to a heightened demand
for children, exacerbating the environmental externalities households impose on future
generations. Our analysis exposes weaknesses in basing family planning programmes entirely
on individuals' reproductive rights. We use ecological data to obtain a feel for the size of global
environmental externalities. We estimate the size of world population the biosphere can support
at the standard of living enjoyed in the World Bank's list of high middle-income countries.
Today's global population and future population projections far exceed our estimate, implying
that the UN's Sustainable Development Goals are in all likelihood unsustainable. We conclude
that family planning has been undervalued greatly by national governments and international
agencies. Our purpose is to pose questions that continue to be neglected in the development
literature. We do not offer forecasts nor make policy recommendations.
      The term "natural capital" is now in routine use among ecologists and economists to remind1
us that Nature is a capital asset with both intrinsic and use value. In what follows we use the
terms "Nature", "natural capital", and "the natural environment" synonymously. The influence
of human numbers on the natural environment is beginning to be noted again in demographic
writings. See, for example, Birdsall, Kelley, and Sinding (2001), Bryant et al. (2009), and Jiang
and Hardee (2011).
      The latter index was proposed by UNDP (1990) and has been revised and updated by the2
organization ever since.
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Motivation
Among economists and demographers, the dominant view of the impact of growing
human numbers on the natural environment has alternated between concern and dismissal. If in
the years immediately following the Second World War scholars were anxious that population
growth would retard economic development in poor countries, they have not worried in recent
decades. In a series of influential reviews of the modern growth experience, NRC (1986),
Birdsall (1988), Kelley (1988), Temple (1999), and Helpman (2004) studied cross country data
and saw a negligible link - possibly even a small positive link - between population growth and
growth in per capita GDP. Their analysis was convincing, but the underlying assumption that
economic betterment is best seen in terms of growth in GDP per capita should be questioned.
The presence of the qualifier "gross" in gross domestic product (GDP) signals that the measure
does not record the depreciation of natural capital that can accompany the production of goods
and services.  Other things equal, depreciation of natural capital reduces a nation's productive1
capacity, the correct measure of which is an inclusive notion of wealth. And normative
economics tells us that the index we should deploy for assessing the sustainability of human
development is the wealth of nations (Arrow et al, 2012), not the GDP of nations, nor the Human
Development Index of nations.2
A rich demographic literature has offered insights into fertility behaviour in the
contemporary world. Those insights have been used by the United Nations to frame family
planning programmes (UNFPA, 1995). More recently they have influenced the way family
planning has been placed within the UN's Sustainable Development Goals. We apply those
insights to argue that the basis on which women's desired family size are elicited mis-estimate
their desire. More importantly, they under-estimate their needs.
Parental desires and needs constitute one set of factors in population ethics. Another set
of factors is the effect on others of a household's reproductive behaviour. Ehrlich and Holdren
(1971) coined the metaphor I=PAT so as to trace humanity's impact on the biosphere (more
generally, the Earth system) to population size, affluence (income per capita), and "technology"-
in-use (including knowledge, institutions, social capital). The authors observed that Nature
responds to the demands we make of it, not to rates of change in those demands nor to rates of
change in the rates of change in those demands. Their observation has not had much influence
      For extended discussions on the place of Nature in the lives of the world's poor, see3
Dasgupta (2003, 2007, 2010).  
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on either economics or demography. That the growth rate of global population has been
declining in recent years is seen among development experts as a hopeful sign of a transition to
sustainable development (World Bank, 2016); in fact it does not say much about the prospect of
realizing sustainable development. Under foreseeable technological developments, a long run
population of 10-11 billion can be expected to make a far greater demand on the biosphere than
one of, say, 3 billion. Recent books that have drawn attention to the remarkable gains in the
standard of living that we have enjoyed during the past century have focussed on advances in
scientific knowledge and the accumulation of manufactured and human capital; the state of the
biosphere and its trends accompanying that progress have for the most part gone unnoted
(Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2000; Ridley, 2010; Deaton, 2013; Lomborg, 2014; Norberg,
2016). But humanity's future will be shaped by the portfolio of assets we choose to hold and the
balance we strike between them and the size of our population. It should be a concern, or so we
argue below, that the enormous economic success we have enjoyed in recent decades may be a
down payment for future failure.
Among the visible products of the biosphere are food, fibres, fuel, and fresh water; but
many of the services it provides are hidden from view. Ecosystems maintain a genetic library,
preserve and regenerate soil, fix nitrogen and carbon, recycle nutrients, control floods, mitigate
droughts, filter pollutants, assimilate waste, pollinate crops, operate the hydrological cycle, and
maintain the gaseous composition of the atmosphere. As most of those services are not visible,
it is all too easy to overlook them. Some environmental stresses are global, many are spatially
localized; some occur slowly and may therefore miss detection until it is too late, while others
are all too noticeable and a cause of persistent societal stresses. The wide divergence of
environmental problems may explain why there are tensions among the senses of urgency people
express about carbon emissions and loss of biodiversity that extend beyond nations, regions, and
continents; about degradation of the oceans arising from the energy and materials we release into
them; about the hardship communities face when grasslands transform into shrub-lands; and
about declines in firewood, water sources, and soil productivity that are specific to the needs and
concerns of the poor in small, village communities.  Environmental problems differ in regard to3
their location, and in their spatial and temporal scales. Which is why it is possible to be
optimistic about humanity's collective ability to overcome environmental problems if one studies
small-scale environmental successes (Balmford and Knowlton, 2017) but to be deeply worried
if one looks at continued failure to stem, say, global biodiversity loss. As we will see presently,
contemporary data at the global level tell us that environmental successes have to date been few
and far between.
Environmental scientists have compiled data on the state of the biosphere and its
6changing character over past decades (MEA, 2005a-d). Corresponding data at local levels are
scattered and range from the detailed to nothing. But global happenings are an aggregate of large
numbers of local happenings. Below we develop an analytical framework for studying fertility
behaviour and humanity's impact on the natural environment at local levels (Part I) and use
aggregate data to obtain a quantitative feel for the impact at the global level (Part II). We find
that the difference between our demand of Nature's goods and services in the aggregate exceeds
Nature's ability to supply them by a considerable margin. Our hope is that the framework we
construct will point, at least partially, to the way the balance between population size and the
portfolio of our assets could be struck.
Externalities
Processes driving the balance between population size and the portfolio of assets we hold
harbour externalities, which are the unaccounted for consequences for others of actions taken by
one or more persons. The qualifier "unaccounted for" means that the consequences in question
follow without prior engagement with those who are affected.
The way we have formulated the notion of externalities could appear ineffective, on
grounds that our actions inevitably have consequences for future generations, who by the nature
of things cannot engage with us. In fact future people engage with us constantly, albeit indirectly.
Parents care about their children and know that they in turn will care about their children. By
recursion, thoughtful parents take the well-being of their descendants into account when
choosing the rates at which they save for their children and invest in them. Intergenerational
engagement would be imperfect if parents choose without adequate concern for their children
(e.g. if they discount the future well-being of their children at overly high rates). Externalities
across the generations would be rampant in that case. We ignore that line of analysis here. Our
aim is to study systematic reasons why choices made even by thoughtful parents do not reflect
adequate engagement with others' descendants. As they are symptoms of institutional failure,
externalities cannot be eliminated without considered collective action. That is why reasoned
reproductive decisions at the individual level can nevertheless result in collective failure.
Two broad categories of externalities are studied here. One consists of the consequences
of household consumption and reproduction that work through open access resources ("the
commons"). That's the familiar variety of externalities, much noted and studied by environmental
economists (e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1975). Institutional failures in this class of externalities arise
from an absence of appropriate property rights to Nature's goods and services. By property rights
we mean not only private rights, but communitarian and public rights too. One reason rights over
natural capital are difficult to define, let alone enforce, is that Nature is constantly on the move
(the wind blows, particulates diffuse, rivers flow, fish swim, birds and insects fly, and even
earthworms are known to travel undetected). No one can contain the atmosphere they befoul.
That means the price paid by someone for environmental services (that's the private cost) is less
7than the cost borne by all (that's the social cost). In cases involving the global environment, such
as the atmosphere as a sink for our carbon emissions, the damage an individual suffers from her
own emissions is negligible even though the damage to all from the climate change that arises
from everyone's emissions is large and positive. From the collective point of view there is
excessive use of the atmosphere as a carbon sink. The environmental externalities our use of
open access resources gives rise to are adverse.
The other category of externalities we uncover here has been less studied in the literature.
It arises because our desire for having children is in part influenced by the number of children
others have. No doubt a single household cannot much influence others, but the aggregate effect
of all households on one another is not negligible. We show that the social embeddedness of
household preferences - we call the resulting behaviour "conformist" - can lead to high fertility
even when those same preference structures can sustain low fertility that households would
prefer. Either situation - high fertility (allied to low educational attainment of children) or low
fertility (allied to high educational attainment of children) - can sustain itself by its own
bootstrap. Fertility transitions can be interpreted as moves from one equilibrium to the other.
The two classes of externalities have very different internal structures. The problem of
choice in the use of open access resources resembles the well-known Prisoners' Dilemma. In
contrast, socially embedded preferences give rise to Coordination Games. The latter class of
externalities can be, and has been, turned by communities to their advantage by coordinating
behaviour (e.g. through an appeal to social norms); whereas the former requires, at least over the
global commons, more traditional policy measures such as environmental regulations.
Plan of the Paper
When they are adverse, the moral directives that externalities point to can be at odds with
the exercise of rights to protected spheres of action. In Part I (Sections 1-5) we study the clash
of rights among contemporaries and between present and future people. We then study the
implications of those clashes for the design of family planning programmes. In attributing
"rights" to future people we mean just that. We are appealing to a widely shared view, that no
matter who and how many our descendants happen to be, they will have a justifiable claim to a
reasonably abundant resource base. Future people's personal identities don't matter in this
context.
The question arises whether the environmental externalities we identify here are
quantitatively significant. To explore that we adopt an approach that makes use of global
estimates of humanity's demand for the biosphere's products and services relative to their supply.
That exercise is conducted in Part II (Sections 6-10).
In Section 1 we review the legal philosopher Charles Fried's proposed distinction
between positive and negative rights. We apply the distinction to study the clash between the
moral directives flowing from adverse environmental externalities and the exercise of personal
8rights. That acts as a backdrop for Section 2, where it is recalled that prominent social scientists
have been known to insist that there are no environmental externalities arising from procreation.
In Section 3 we explore the interplay of parental motivations and socio-ecological
constraints that help to explain differences in reproductive behaviour across regions and across
socio-economic groups within regions. We look briefly also at what has been called "African
exceptionalism" in reproductive behaviour and identify a class of inter-household externalities
that may have contributed to high fertility rates in that region. Socially embedded preferences
are identified in Section 4 as a source of inter-household externalities, sustaining high fertility
rates. We note possible mechanisms by which behaviour stemming from such preferences can
be redirected toward lower fertility rates. None of the mechanisms involves taxation or coercion.
A central plank of family planning programmes is the idea of reducing "unmet need". The
way unmet need is measured, however, is hugely circumscribed, inasmuch as it is derived from
the respondent's expressed wants, or desire, for biological children. There are two problems here.
First, the methods that are currently deployed for measuring want underestimate it. Secondly,
in matters of life and death human needs operate on a wider space than wants or desires. This
is anothere reason the methods that are currently deployed for measuring unmet need
underestimate it. But even if unmet need is to be inferred from expressed desires, the methods
deployed underestimate it. In Section 5 we meet the first problem by suggesting ways to reframe
questionnaires so as to enable family planning agencies to discover people's considered
preferences for children. We show also that the UN's Sustainable Development Goals include
a measure for judging the success of family planning programmes that potentially creates wrong
incentives to officials overseeing the programmes. Our analysis reveals that family planning
programmes are undervalued by national governments and international agencies.
By how much? To determine that, we have to go beyond measuring unmet need and try
to quantify environmental externalities. Unfortunately estimates of the environmental
externalities traceable to procreation are sparse. Customary methods for measuring externalities
infer people's willingness to pay for Nature's products and services from their behaviour or from
their expressed preferences. Those methods are unavailable for reaching global estimates; nor
are they appropriate for the purpose in hand. We circumvent those problems by studying global
statistics on natural capital and identify key processes that drive the biosphere (Sects. 6-7). Such
information isn't sufficient for quantifying the benefits of family planning programmes, but it
offers a way for estimating the annual global demand we make of the biosphere and compare it
to the annual global supply. That is done in Section 8, where we report that demand has for some
time exceeded supply. The finding says we are drawing down natural capital and therefore that
environmental externalities are substantial. In Section 9 we provide crude estimates of the global
population that the biosphere can support at a comfortable standard of living. The gap between
the figure we reach and the current size of the world's population is substantial. Our estimate
      By providing access to subsidized contraceptive commodities and services, family planning4
programmes were successful in accelerating fertility declines in Asia and Latin America in the
1960s-1980s. The rationale for vigorously expanding the content and reach of such programmes
today lies in the 189 million married/in-union women of reproductive age in the developing
world (41 million in sub-Saharan Africa) who have an unmet need for modern methods of
contraception; that is, they report they do not want to get pregnant but are not using any modern
method (UNPD, 2016). In addition to reducing unintended births, contraceptive use among
women enhances their own health and that of their children by spacing births. And yet family
planning remains a neglected feature of public policy. Currently less than 1 per cent of overseas
development assistance is awarded to it. Moreover, developing countries relegate family
planning expenditures to minor government departments. Despite evidence that family planning
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could be viewed as an overestimate of what lies in the future, inasmuch as sustainable population
at a comfortable living standard would be higher if future technological advances economize on
the use of natural capital. On the other hand, our estimate could be viewed as an underestimate
of what lies in  the future, inasmuch as global population has been projected to rise to 11.2
billion by the end of the century and the United Nations via their Sustainable Development Goals
have simultaneously encuraged us to expect significant increases in per capita incomes. Whether
resource saving technological advances are likely to blunt humanity's demands for Nature's
products and services even as economic activities increase is, of course, a matter of speculation;
so we identify reasons why technological changes in the past have been rapacious in the use of
natural capital and suggest policies that would create incentives to innovate in technologies that
have a lighter touch on Nature's products and services.
The analysis in Sections 8-9 is based on figures based on global averages. Central to the
UN's Sustainable Development Goals, however, is poverty alleviation. In Section 10 we study
the impact of poverty alleviation measures on the global demand for Nature's goods and services.
Our analysis uncovers yet another clash of rights among contemporaries and between present
and future people.
Although the externalities we classify here arise in all contemporary societies, a salient
contrast obtains between rich (high consuming) societies with low desired family-size, and poor
(low consuming) societies with high desired family-size. Environmental externalities arising
from the activities of people in rich countries are included in our analysis (they are due to the
high consumption enjoyed by new births over their lifetime). Simple calculations show too that
contemporary global environmental problems cannot be traced to high fertility in the poor
regions of the world. Nevertheless, we focus our study on reproductive behaviour in the world's
poorest region, sub-Saharan Africa, because desired family size there is strikingly large in
comparison to standards elsewhere today and because the costs of the correspondingly high
population growth rate can be expected to be borne in great measure by future Africans
themselves. The benefits of family planning programmes have been routinely under-estimated
by the international community, but perhaps most conspicuously, at least until recently, that too
only in a few countries, by governments in sub-Saharan Africa (Section 11).4
reduces poverty, the World Bank does not have family planning at its core.
      The binary classification of rights corresponds to Isaiah Berlin's classification of freedom5
into positive and negative categories (Berlin, 1959).
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Part I
1 Rights
The legal philosopher Charles Fried distinguished "positive" from "negative" rights
(Fried, 1978). We are to think of positive rights as a claim to something, a share of material
goods or some particular commodity such as education when young and medical attention when
in need. A negative right is a right that something not be done to one, that some particular
imposition be withheld. Fried observed that positive rights are asserted to scarce goods and that
scarcity implies a limit to their claim. He also suggested that negative rights, for example the
right not to be interfered with in forbidden ways, do not appear to have such natural limitations.
("If I am let alone, the commodity I obtain does not appear of its nature to be a scarce or limited
one. How can we run out of people not harming each other, not lying to each other, leaving each
other alone?" (Fried, 1978: p. 110)).5
Fried's dichotomy is useful for studying the place of rights in family planning
programmes. But his suggestion that the exercise of negative rights doesn't involve costs is
questionable. The claim that one's proximity should not be contaminated by cigarette smoke is
a negative right, which is violated when someone smokes in that proximity. To protect that right,
governments in many countries prohibit people from choosing at will where they smoke. That's
a cost to smokers. In contrast, a right to exercise one's agency would appear to be a positive right
(e.g. freedom of speech), but it doesn't inevitably demand resources from others. It isn't so much
that negative rights don't suffer from resource limitations whereas positive rights do, it is more
that the two sets of rights have separate frames of reference. The contrasting phrases, "right to
self-determination" and "right to have an imposition withheld", point in different directions.
The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development reaffirmed the
language of rights in the sphere of family planning and reproductive health. The widely noted
publication that reported the Conference's conclusions stated:
"Reproductive rights ... rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples and
individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing, and timing of their children,
and to have information and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standards of
sexual and reproductive health." (UNFPA, 1995: Ch. 7, Sect.3).
The qualifier, "responsibly", could be read as requiring couples to take into account the
adverse environmental externalities their reproductive decisions may give rise to; but that
probably would be a stretch. Certainly, writings affirming the UN declaration have interpreted
the passage and its intent more narrowly. For example, the fundamental right of individuals "to
      Kumar and Hardee (2015) offer a useful manual for family planning programmes based on6
the protection and promotion of reproductive rights.
Rights had been deployed as an ethical category in discussions on family planning and
reproductive health previous to the 1994 International Conference on Population and
Development. Hardee et al. (2014) provide an excellent account of the history. The authors also
provide a framework for achieving the goals of FP2020. Cottingham et al. (2012) offer an
account of the power of the language of rights in encouraging governments and international
agencies to provide the resources needed to meet women's "unmet need" for family planning and
reproductive health facilities (see Section 5).
      Brock (2010) contains an interesting discussion of possible clashes between parental rights7
and societal interests and how societies variously resolve them. But he was not concerned with
the clash that is embodied in environmental externalities. The tension between reproductive
rights and sustainable development has been commented upon rece ntly (e.g. Hardee, 2014;
Newman et al, 2014), but it would appear not to have influenced development thinking within
the Unitd Nations, at least not so far. 
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decide freely and for themselves, whether, when, and how many children to have" is central to
the vision and goals of Family Planning 2020 (FP2020). It is also pivotal in the reproductive
health indicators of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. Both positive and
negative rights are in play here. Rights to information and other services pertaining to family
planning and reproductive health are positive rights. The right to choose one's family size on the
other hand would appear to be a negative right.6
Even though Fried's classification is not without problems, it is useful for studying the
relationship between "externalities" and "rights". First, to insist that the rights of individuals and
couples to decide freely the number of children they produce trump all competing interests is to
play down the rights of all those (most especially, perhaps, future people) who suffer from the
environmental externalities that accompany additions to the population. Secondly, UNFPA's
statement ignores the latent need among those who do not want family planning now but would
want it if others among their peer group were using modern contraceptives. We study the two
in turn.7
2 Ours vs Theirs
That reproductive decisions may involve a clash of rights isn't self-evident. In a powerful
essay that dismissed concerns on over-population, Bauer (1981: 61-64) wrote: "The
comparatively high fertility and large families in many ldcs (less developed countries) should
not be regarded as irrational, abnormal, incomprehensible or unexpected. They accord with the
tradition of most cultures and with the precepts of religious and political leaders... Allegations
or apprehensions of adverse or even disastrous results of population growth are unfounded. They
rest on seriously defective analysis of the determinants of economic performance; they
misconceive the conduct of the peoples of ldcs; and they employ criteria of welfare so
inappropriate that they register as deterioration changes which are in fact improvements in the
conditions of people."
      World Bank (2012) reported that in 2010 the proportion of people who completed primary8
education was, in India 96%, in Pakistan 67%, and in Bangladesh, 65%. Total fertility rates
(TFRs) in those countries were 2.6, 3.4, and 2.2, respectively. It should also be noted that in
Bangladesh non-governmental organizations at work on social matters have a far more extensive
reach than in India and Pakistan. Reproductive behaviour is not mono-causal.
      Nudge theory advocates a weak version of that idea. See Thaler and Sunstein (2008).9
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One problem with Bauer's critique is that it gives the impression that societies in past eras
were characterized by large families. But if fertility rates were high then, so were mortality rates
high; and high fertility rates are a rational response to high mortality rates. The contemporary
demographic problem in the world's poorest regions is that fertility rates remain high even
though mortality rates have fallen considerably (Sect. 3). The main problem with Bauer's
critique, however, is that even when men and women at the household level prefer large numbers
of children to small numbers, it doesn't follow there isn't a resource allocation failure they
themselves would acknowledge if only they were asked. As in every other field of personal
choice, we should ask whether a collection of reasoned decisions at the individual level may
harbour collective failure. This is the central question raised by externalities, and it has particular
potency in the case of adverse externalities and socially embedded preferences.
That family planning services bring in their wake many benefits (health, education,
income, women's empowerment) to those who make use of them has been documented
repeatedly in recent years (Koenig et al., 1992); Debpuur et al., 2002; Cleland et al., 2006, 2012;
Tsui et al., 2010; Canning and Schultz, 2012; Sonfield et al., 2013; Bongaarts, 2016; Miller and
Babiarz, 2016). Our focus on externalities points to the fact that they bring benefits to others as
well. Those additional benefits should be included in the design of social policies. We will find
that indicators currently in use by governments and NGOs of the value of family planning
services underestimate it.
Policies for curbing adverse reproductive externalities can in principle take several forms.
Education, especially female education, is one route; many argue it is the most effective route
(Lutz et al., 2014). But that can take time, and female education is not the only factor driving
fertility.  Another tool involves demonstrative persuasion, which can be attempted through8
community discussions on the need for behavioural change. The agency of persuasion could be
the community, NGOs, or the state.  A further tool is taxation, which permits people to choose9
as they wish, but at a price. Although taxation as a device for curbing environmental externalities
is familiar in wealthy countries, it is not an available tool for reducing the demand for children
in poor countries, where the poorest households are most often the ones that have the highest
demand. A further policy tool is quota, such as China's previous directive of one-child family,
or the government's recently revised two-children-per-couple directive.
 Quotas are an extreme form of non-linear tax schedule: zero tax up to the quota,
      Sen (1982) likens the emission of persistent pollutants to torturing future people. The clash10
between reproductive rights and adverse environmental externalities allied to new births is at its
most striking under his reading.
      Writing about West Africa, Fortes (1978: 125-6) said "... a person does not feel he has11
fulfilled his destiny until he or she not only becomes a parent but has grandchildren...
(Parenthood) is also a fulfilment of fundamental kinship, religious and political obligations, and
represents a commitment by parents to transmit the cultural heritage of the community ...
Ancestry, as juridically rather than biologically defined, is the primary criterion ... for the
allocation of economic, political, and religious status."
      Between 1965 and 2015 the infant mortality rate in sub-Saharan Africa declined from about12
150 per 1,000 live births to something like 60 per 1,000 live births.
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followed by a severe tax beyond it. (The "tax" need not be monetary, it could be strong collective
disapproval.) An alternative to taxing people if they exceed their quota is to reward people if
they stay within their quota. We are thinking of "quota" here in the same way as people think of
quotas when they are imposed as food rations in periods of extreme shortage, compulsory
vaccination against communicable diseases, and prohibition on smoking in public spaces. The
former policy ensures equality in the distribution of a positive right; the latter pair protect and
promote negative rights. Forced sterilization is a distorted and repugnant application of quotas.
Coercion should remain unacceptable.
The classification of externalities we uncover here suggests a variety of policy tools for
reducing fertility rates. The tools differ in terms of the extent to which the right to self-
determination is compromised. None are likely to prove uncontroversial. The issues remain
unsettled.10
3 The Demand for Children and African Exceptionalism
People have children for many reasons. The mix of motivations depends on the customs
and institutions we inherit, as well as on our character and circumstances. That children are
valuable in themselves is emotionally so compelling that it may seem too obvious to require
acknowledgement, but social anthropologists have shown that children are valuable to us not
only because of our innate desire to bear and rear them, but also because they represent the
fulfilment of tradition and religious dictates and because they are the clearest avenue open to
self-transcendence. One such injunction emanates from the cult of the ancestor, which, taking
religion to be the act of reproducing the lineage, requires women to bear many children.  This11
latter motivation was used by Caldwell and Caldwell (1990) to explain why sub-Saharan Africa
has for the most part proved so resistant to fertility decline.
A weakness of the argument is that, although it explains why fertility rates in sub-Saharan
Africa are high (total fertility rate there is 5.1 today; in contrast to 2.5 in India, 1.6 in China, and
the global TFR of 2.5), it does not explain why the rates have not responded as much to declines
in infant mortality as one could have thought on the basis of evidence elsewhere.  Even in sub-12
      For theoretical models that speak to the mutual determination, see Dasgupta (1993, 2000),13
Brander and Taylor (1998), Harford (1998), Dasgupta and Ehrlich (2013), and Bohn and Stuart
(2015). The mutual determination doesn't entail a demographic trap, but it may. See in particular
Dasgupta (2000: Appendix).
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Saharan Africa fertility rates have been below the maximum possible rate. Below we study
possible reasons why the response has been slower than was expected. We should expect the
force of the reasons to vary across regions within the sub-continent. Under increased
urbanization some will have also weakened over time (e.g. the cult of the ancestor). But because
quanttative evidence of their relative significance aross regions is patchy, we merely list them
here.
In places where formal institutions are underdeveloped, children also substitute for other
assets, and are thus also valuable for the many benefits they bring to their parents. This is most
apparent in the poorest regions of the world. Children serve as security in old-age in places that
have neither pension schemes nor adequate land markets. They are also a source of labour in
households possessing few labour saving devices. Children mind their siblings, tend to domestic
animals, pick berries and herbs, collect firewood, draw water, and help with cooking. The need
for additional hands is especially strong among rural communities in dry and semi-arid regions
of the world. Children in poor countries are valued by their parents also as capital and producer
goods. (In South Asia children have been observed to be at work from as early an age as six.)
Caldwell (1981, 1982) put forward the hypothesis that the inter-generational transfer of
resources is from children to parents in poor societies, but from parents to children in rich
societies. The suggestion has been easier to confirm in rich countries, where the rate of
investment in children's education has been found to be as high as 6-7 per cent of GDP
(Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). Confirming the reverse flow in poor countries has been a lot
harder, in part because data are sparse but in part also because even within poor regions there
are significant differences in attitudes toward reproduction. Those differences are traceable to
kinship structures, marriage practices, and rules of inheritance. The implied line of thinking says
that over the long run it is differences in institutions and social norms - originating perhaps in
some measure in geography - that are the reasons behind differences in reproductive behaviour
among groups. This form of analysis says that high child mortality rates spur fertility because
of parental need to increase the probability of not being childless in old age. Theoretical models
have been built on the premise that institutional failure, broadly defined, is the deep cause of pro-
natalism. Causality isn't traced to differences in income or wealth. It is not that fertility and
mortality rates are high and health status and education attainments are low in poor regions
because people there are poor, it's that very low incomes go hand in hand with those features of
life. Each variable influencs the others over time; in the long run they are mutually determined.13
A potential source of reproductive externality is the wedge between the private and social
      To see that there are no externalities if the shares were the same, suppose c is the cost of14
rearing a child and N the number of couples within a kinship. Assume that each child makes
available y units of output (this is the norm) to the entire kinship, which is then shared equally
among all couples, say in their old age. Suppose also that the cost of rearing each child is shared
equally by all couples. Let n* be the number of children each couple other than the one under
study chooses to have. If n were to be the number of children this couple produces, it would
incur the resource cost C = [nc+(N-1)n*c]/N, and eventually the couple would receive an income
from the next generation equalling Y = [ny+(N-1)n*y]/N. Denote the couple's aggregate utility
function by the form U(Y)-K(C), where both U(.) and K(.) are increasing and strictly concave
functions. Letting n be a continuous variable for simplicity, it is easy to confirm that the couple
in question will choose the value of n at which ydU(Y)/dY = cdK(C)/dC. The choice sustains a
social equilibrium when n = n*. It is easy to check that this is also the condition which is met in
a society where there is no reproductive free-riding. It follows that there is free-riding if the
parents' share of the benefits from having children exceeds their share of the costs.
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costs of child rearing. The costs borne by parents are lower when child rearing is shared among
the kinship than when households are nuclear. In sub-Saharan Africa fosterage within the kinship
is a commonplace. Children are not raised solely by their parents, the responsibility is more
diffuse within the kinship group (Caldwell, 1991; Bledsoe, 1990, 1994). Fosterage in the African
context is not adoption. It is not intended to, nor does it in fact, break ties between parents and
children. The institution affords a form of mutual insurance protection in semi-arid regions. As
savings opportunities are few in the low-productivity agricultural regions of sub-Saharan Africa,
fosterage also enables households to smooth their consumption across time. In parts of West
Africa up to half the children have been found to be living with their kin at any given time.
Nephews and nieces have the same rights of accommodation and support as do biological
offspring. There is a sense in which children are seen as a common responsibility; which makes
it important that in surveys that seek to identify desired numbers of children (Sect. 5) it is made
clear that what the questionnaires mean is biological children. However, the arrangement creates
a free-rider problem if the parents' share of the benefits from having children exceeds their share
of the costs. The corresponding externalities are confined to the kinship. Other things equal,
reduction in those externalities would be accompanied by a fall in the demand for children and
all households would benefit.14
Related to this is a phenomenon that has been observed by Guyer (1994) in a Yoruba area
of Nigeria. In the face of deteriorating economic circumstances, some women bear children by
different men so as to create immediate lateral links with them. Polyandrous motherhood enables
women to have access to more than one resource network. Children are a further form of wealth
for their mothers. Desired fertility is consequently higher.
The idea of wealth-in-people has been developed by anthropologists to reflect the
additional status and other social advantages that are conferred on women in some African
societies by having children (Guyer and Eno Belinga, 1995). There is a formal resemblance here
to Veblen's account of status in an entirely different context, namely, conspicuous consumption
in the Gilded Age in America. In the present context, desired fertility is higher because of the
      In an early review of fertility intentions Cochrane and Farid (1989) noted that both the15
urban and rural, the educated and uneducated in sub-Saharan Africa have more, and want more,
children than their counterparts in other less-developed regions. Even young women there
expressed a desire for an average of 2.6 more children than women in the Middle East, 2.8 more
than women in North Africa, and 3.6 to 3.7 more than women in Latin America and Asia.
Updated versions of these figures are available, but we are presenting data from the mid-1980s
because the income gap between Africa and the rest of the developing world was smaller at that
time than it is now.
African society's exceptionalism has been much written about. See in addition Goody
(1976), Bledsoe and Pison (1994), Bongaaarts (2011), and Bongaarts and Casterline (2013). But
changes have been observed, at least in East Africa. Fostering is declining, land registration is
increasing, and urbanization is eroding pronatal institutions. Whether those changes will
markedly influence fertility rates in the near future isn't clear. And delay matters to Africa's
future prospects (Sect. 11). We are grateful to John Cleland for helpful discussions on this.
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competition fueled by the desire for status. It leads to a collective loss in well-being.
Communal land tenure of the lineage social structure in sub-Saharan Africa has offered
yet another inducement for men to procreate: a greater amount of land can be claimed by a larger
family. In addition, conjugal bonds are frequently weak, so fathers often do not bear their fair
share of costs of siring a child. Anthropologists have observed that the unit of African society
is a woman and her children, rather than parents and their children. Frequently, there is no
common budget for the man and woman. Descent in sub-Saharan Africa is, for the most part,
patrilineal and residence is patrilocal (exceptions are the Akan of Ghana and the Chewa of
Malawi). That depresses women's voice; and because women bear a disproportionate amount of
the costs of reproduction, it raises the fertility rate. Patrilineality, weak conjugal bonds,
communal land tenure, and a strong kinship support system of children, taken together, have
been a broad characteristic of the region. In principle they provide a powerful stimulus to
fertility. Admittedly, patrilineality and patrilocality are features of the northern parts of the
Indian sub-continent also. But conjugal bonds are substantially greater there. Moreover, as
agricultural land is not communally held, large family sizes lead to fragmentation of land-
holdings. In contrast, large families in sub-Saharan Africa are (or, at least were, until recently)
rewarded by a greater share of land belonging to the lineage or clan.15
4 Socially Embedded Preference Structures and Conformism
That children are a parental end (and not just a means toward other parental goals)
provides a potentially powerful mechanism by which reasoned fertility decisions at the level of
every household could lead to an unsatisfactory outcome from the perspectives of all households.
It arises from the possibility that traditional practice is perpetuated by conformity. Reproductive
decisions are not only a private matter; they are subject to social mores, which in turn are
influenced by both family experiences and the cultural milieu. But social mores are shaped by
the behaviour of all. There is circularity in this, which we can unravel by supposing that
household preference structures are socially embedded. Behaviour is conformist when the family
size each household desires is positively related to the average family size in the community
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(Dasgupta, 1993: Ch. 12).
Douglas and Ney (1998) urged us to regard consumption as an expression of social
engagement. Taken literally, that would appear odd, but what authors were pointing to is that a
meal taken alone is a different activity from a meal taken communally. Fads and fashion may be
short-run expressions of social engagement, what Douglas and Ney showed us is that our need
to belong is deep and enduring and expresses itself in a wide variety of ways. We rely on one
another for safety, consolation, information, companionship, and governance. Much of our
actions are undertaken in a social setting, and all our actions are influenced in part by attention
to others.
Whatever the basis of conformism (we discuss that below), there would be practices
encouraging high fertility that no household would unilaterally desire to break. Such practice
could have had a rationale in the past, when mortality rates were high, population densities were
low, natural resources were aplenty, the threat of extermination from outside attack was large,
and mobility was restricted. But practices can survive even when their original purposes have
disappeared. One reason they can survive is that if all others continue to follow the practice and
aim at large family sizes, no conformist household would on its own wish to deviate from the
practice; however, if all other households were to restrict their fertility rates, every household
would wish to restrict its fertility rate as well. Conformism can thus be a reason for the existence
of multiple social equilibria. A society could get embedded in a self-sustaining mode of
behaviour characterized by high fertility and low educational attainment, even when there is
another potentially self-sustaining mode of behaviour characterized by low fertility and high
educational attainment and which is preferred by all.
Socially embedded preferences for children are drawn in Figure 1. The curve ABCDE
is the representative household's desired number of children, plotted against the average number
of children per household (the horizontal axis). The curve is upward sloping and intersects the
1 2 345  line OF at three points: B, C, D. Each is a social equilibrium, at TFRs n , n , and no
respectively. To interpret ABCDE with concrete numbers, imagine that each household regards
35 to be the ideal number of children if all other households have 5 children (n  on the horizontal
2axis)); 4 to be the ideal number if all others have 4 (n ); and 2 to be the ideal number if all others
1have 2 (n ). Imagine now that each household prefers the outcome where all households have 2
children. It can nevertheless be that their society is stuck in a situation where each household has
5 children. It can get stuck because no household would have a reason to deviate from 5 if all
other households have 5; which is another way of saying that 5 is a self-enforcing choice. It is
easy to confirm that both 2 and 5 are stable equilibria, in that a small deviation from 2
(respectively, 5) would in time return to a situation where each household chooses 2
      Formally, we are studying Nash equilibria in a coordination game (Dasgupta, 1993; Kohler,16
22000). It can be shown that the social equilibrium in which each household has 4 children (n )
is unstable. It would take us far afield to explain why, but see Dasgupta (2002) for the reason.
      Farooq et al. (1987) is an early study that spoke to the phenomenon in West Africa. Lutz17
et al. (2014) is a collection of essays on the effect of education on fertility behaviour. Interactions
among the elite and the general public can be a vehicle by which fertility behaviour among the
poor changes.
      The media are increasingly used to such end. For example, the Development Media18
International runs media campaigns aimed at changing behaviour.
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(respectively, 5). It follows that 5 would be just as tenacious a TFR as 2.16
That does not mean society would be stuck at 5 forever. As always, people differ in the
extent of their absorption of traditional practice. There would inevitably be those who, for one
reason or another, experiment, take risks, and refrain from joining the crowd. They are the
tradition breakers, and they often lead the way. Educated women are among the first to make the
move toward smaller families.  A possibly even stronger pathway is the influence that17
newspapers, radio, television, and now the internet play in transmitting information about other
life-styles (Freedman, 1995, was one of the first to detect that pathway). The idea here is that the
media could be a vehicle by which conformism increasingly becomes based on the behaviour
of a wider population than the local community (the peer group widens). And that disrupts
behaviour.18
There have been a number of studies on fertility that point to choices that are guided in
part by attention to others. In her highly original work on demographic change in Western
Europe over the period 1870-1960, Watkins (1990) showed that differences in fertility and
nuptiality within each country declined. She also found that in 1870, before the large-scale
declines in marital fertility had begun in most areas of Western Europe, demographic behaviour
differed considerably within countries. Differences among provinces within a country were high
even while differences within provinces was low. Spatial behavioural clumps suggest the
importance of the influence of local communities on behaviour. In 1960 differences within each
country were considerably less than in 1870. Watkins explained this in terms of increases in the
geographical reach national governments enjoyed over the 90 years in question. The growth of
national languages could have been the medium through which reproductive behaviour was able
to spread.
Watkins' was a historical study, as were the studies Montgomery and Casterline (1998)
made use of to distinguish various pathways by which reproductive practices diffuse within a
society. In a commentary on West Bengal (India) where fertility rates declined in the early 1970s
ahead of the northern states of India and neighbouring Bangladesh, Basu and Amin (2000)
attributed the West Bengal experience to historical and cultural facts there that combined to
promote interaction between the elite and the general public. Jensen and Oster (2009) in contrast
      For a wide ranging discussion of the role of societal norms on fertility behaviour, see19
Bongaarts and Watkins (1996).
      Diffusion processes had been studied long before, in connection with technology adoption.20
In a classic paper, Griliches (1957) conducted an empirical study of the spread of hybrid corn
in the US. In his model farmers observed the successful adoption of new varieties before
adopting them themselves. The process gave rise to the now-familiar logistic pattern of adoption.
On the effect of the diffusion of ideas brought about by family planning programmes on
reproductive behaviour, see Babalola, Folda, and Babayora (2008) and Krenn et al. (2014). 
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have studied a natural experiment. They found that state level fertility rates declined in step
following staggered introductions of cable TV in Indian states.19
It is a feature of historical studies of the diffusion of behaviour across space and time that
they don't necessarily identify the fundamentals on which the diffusion process is built. They
also differ from one another in terms of the transmission mechanism. The behavioural
fundamentals (or "drivers", as some would call them) could be knowledge acquisition, they could
be pure mimicry, they could be what Cleland and Wilson (1987) called "ideation", they could
be the advent of modernity, they could be the desire to belong to one's (possibly expanding)
group, they could be the force of celebrity culture, and so on. These fundamentals are not
unrelated of course, but they are not the same. Regarding transmission mechanisms, it could be
that people observe successful behaviour and copy it, it could be that the language in which
newspapers are read spreads, it could be that people discuss and debate among themselves, and
so forth.20
The model in Figure 1 is built on the common structure of all such diffusion processes.
Leaving aside the virtue of parsimony, studying the common structure offers the advantage that
we are able to analyse the resting (i.e. equilibrium) points of a wide variety of diffusion
processes without having to identify the processes themselves. Our model is analytical, not a
historical narrative. It assumes that fertility preferences are socially embedded, but it doesn't
specify the reasons households are influenced by the behaviour of others. Being analytical, the
model is able to entertain counterfactuals. It allows us to ask how a household's behaviour would
differ if the social parameters underlying the curve ABCDE were to be otherwise. That's a
necessary exercise in policy analysis, because policies can be used to shift the curve ABCDE
1 2 3(therefore the equilibrium points n , n , and n ) as well as influence the beliefs on the basis of
which households act. The common structure also tells us that fertility transitions can be
interpreted as disequilibrium phenomena (Dasgupta, 2002), where practices change slowly in
response to gradual changes in the social environment, until a tipping point is reached from
which society transits rapidly to a new stable equilibrium, say from high fertility to low fertility.
Socially embedded preference structures don't entail multiplicity of equilibria. We could
have so drawn the curve ABCDE in Figure 1 that it intersects the 45  line OF at a single point.o
We are interested in multiple equilibria because there is empirical evidence that societies support
      Casterline and Sinding (2000) discuss ways in which the measure of unmet need can be21
used to inform family planning policies.
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1 3a multiplicity of stable fertility choices (e.g. n  and n ). Historical studies of the diffusion of
fertility behaviour point to that (Watkins, 1990). Fertility transitions are an expression of the
phenomenon.
The common structure of diffusion processes that we are studying proves useful also for
interpreting statistical regularities between wanted fertility (Sect. 5) and actual fertility. Pritchett
(1994) for example regressed actual fertility on wanted fertility in a sample of 43 countries in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He found that about 90 percent of cross-country differences in
actual fertility (TFR) are associated with differences in wanted fertility (WTFR). He also found
excess fertility not to be systematically related to actual fertility, nor to be an important
determinant of it.
Pritchett concluded from his study that high fertility is due entirely to the strong desire
for children. Our model draws a different conclusion. That fertility preferences are socially
embedded tells us that we should expect the correlation Pritchett obtained, but it also warns us
not to attribute causality to the relationship. It would be as true to say fertility rates in those
countries in Pritchett's sample where they are high are high because people have a strong desire
for children as it would be to say that people there have a strong desire to have children because
fertility rates are high.
5 Unmet Need, Desired Family Size, and the UN's Sustainable Development Goals
UNFPA (1995) took it that family planning and reproductive health policies should
address "unmet need", meaning that they should be made to serve women aged 15-49 who are
seeking to stop or delay child-bearing but are not using modern forms of contraception (Bradley
et al., 2012; Alkema et al., 2013). Although the idea of "unmet need" could appear
straightforward, it has in practice proved to be complex and has been interpreted in different
ways over the years. It is currently measured using more than 15 survey questions, including
questions on contraceptive use, fertility intentions, pregnancies, postpartum amenorreah, sexual
activity, birth history, and menstruation. Women's reported fertility intentions are inferred from
such questions as: "Now, I have some questions about the future. Would you like to have
a(nother) child or would you prefer not to have (any more) children?" That is followed by a
question on how long the women wants to wait should she have responded to the previous
question that she does not want a(nother) child.21
There are deep problems here. Unmet need as calculated from responses to survey
questions is based on the respondent's expresed wants for biological children. The need for
family planning is then inferred from the unmet need. But in matters of life and death resource
needs assume an independent status, they even serve as the basis on which commodity rights are
founded. The philosopher David Wiggins has argued that a statment of the form "person A needs
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commodity X" is tantamount to a challenge to imagine an alternative future in which A escapes
harm without X (Wiggins, 1987: 22). Expressed wants or desires for children - used for
calculating unmet need for family planning - may not adequately convey her true need for family
planning, that is, for her own best interests. A poor woman, suffering from iron deficiency and
living in a setting where she is more or less compelled to have sex, has a need for contraception
for her own benefit that could remain undetected in her responses to questions on the expressed
wants for biological children. To infer needs solely from wants is therefore to undervalue the
significance of family planning. Moreover, none of the survey questions is conditioned on the
behaviour of others. As we see below, that too is limiting. The line joining need to expressed
wants is toruous.
Closely related is the notion of "desired family size", which is obtained from answers to
the following question:
"If you could go back to the time when you did not have any children and could choose
exactly the number of children to have in your whole life, how many would that be?"
The "wanted total fertility rate", or WTFR, is calculated by first dividing the number of
observed births into those that occurred before and after the desired family size is reached (the
former are considered as wanted, the latter unwanted). WTFR is then obtained with the same
procedure as the one used in calculating TFR (that is, from age-specific fertility rates), but only
wanted births are included in the numerator of these rates.
There are dangers of biases in responses to the question at the basis of desired family
size, but the need for family planning programmes to have quantitative estimates of it is clear
enough. Notice though that the questionnaire does not ask of someone what her desire would be
if the prevailing fertility practices of others were different. In fact there is no mention of the
prevailing fertility rate. As respondents are not invited to disclose their conditional desires, it is
most likely they disclose their desired family size on the assumption that fertility will remain at
its prevailing rate. A direct way to discover socially embedded preferences would be to
reconstruct the questionnaires by asking a series of conditional questions, which we collapse here
for convenience into one:
"If you could go back to the time when you did not have any children and could choose
exactly the number of children to have in your whole life, how many would that be, assuming
everyone else in your community had n children over their whole life?"
The survey could pose the conditional question in an ascending order of n, say from 0
to 10 (thus 11 conditional questions in total). The example in Figure 1 imagines that the answers
to n = 2, 4, and 5 are, respectively, 2, 4, and 5. It also imagines that answers to the questions in
which n = 0, 1, 3, 6-10, respectively, differ from 0, 1, 3, 6-10; which is why the latter numbers
are not social equilibria. No doubt responding to a string of conditional questions would tax
      Because people's preferences differ, we should expect the responses to differ but discover22
that each individual's preferred number of children is an increasing function of n. That would
reveal socially embedded preferences.
      Moral philosophers would argue that the evaluation of family planning programmes should23
include the quality of lives that will not be lived on account of the programmes. We avoid those
further considerations by assuming that thoughtful parents reach their fertility desires by taking
into account the potential well-being of their offspring and, by recursion, the well-being of their
dynasty.
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respondents, but to not ask them is to misread fertility desires.22
Fabic et al. (2015) defined "total demand" for modern contraception to be the number of
women who want to delay or limit child-bearing (i.e. the sum of contraceptive users and women
with unmet need). The role of family planning, the authors argued, is to supply that demand. The
suggestion is that the success of family planning should be measured by the ratio of family
planning users to the total demand. The United Nations have adopted this measure in their
Sustainable Development Goal 3.7.1. It is known as "demand for family planning met with
modern contraceptive methods", or "demand satisfied" for short. Formally, if X is the number
of women between 15-49 who are users of modern contraceptives, Y is the number of women
with unmet need, and Z is total demand for modern contraception, then Z = X+Y and the UN's
"demand satisfied" is X/Z = X/(X+Y).
Reproductive rights are at the heart of X/Z, which is its attraction. The indicator reflects
voluntarism, rights and equity, informed choice, and the imperative of satisfying individuals' and
couples' own choices with regard to the timing and number of children. But there are problems.
The use of X/Z as the measure of success could create perverse incentives among programmes
managers. A programme's performance would improve if more women were to declare that they
want to get pregnant. So long as women want many children, Y (unmet need) remains small, and
therefore Z (total demand) is only marginally greater than X (the number of modern
contraceptive users). The country scores well in the indicator "demand satisfied" and appears not
to need further family planning programming. The success could mask a situation where
contraceptive use is low and stagnant and high fertility rates persist. Moreover, as we saw in
Section 4, fertility preferences, which contribute to the measurement of Y, are themselves
influenced by the behaviour of others. Y could therefore be small in a society that harbours
another equilibrium in which Y is large.
The concept of reproductive rights, as currently framed, undervalues family planning.
There are collective benefits to be enjoyed if members of a community are enabled to alter their
fertility desires in a coordinated manner. Family planning can help to bring about changes in
such social norms. Our analysis doesn't run against rights as a plank for family planning; it
expands the sphere in which rights are acknowledged, protected, and promoted.23
Part II
23
6 The Biosphere as an Open Access Resource
To the best of our knowledge there are no national estimates of the environmental
benefits of family planning. So we make a direct approach to estimating the benefits by
reviewing humanity's demand for ecological services at the global level. For that it proves useful
to regard the biosphere as a single renewable natural resource. The stance involves a heroic
aggregation exercise, in which billions of assets are aggregated into a single measure. If that
seems an absurd undertaking, we should recall that global fisheries and forest biomes are
routinely measured in units of biomass, which also involves giant aggregation exercises. No
doubt problems of aggregation are magnified when we study the biosphere as a whole, but they
aren't magnified that much in complexity.
One reason the biosphere is hard to aggregate is that the biogeochemical processes that
shape natural capital differ widely in both speed and spatial reach. As most global environmental
resources have no prices attached to them (there is an absence of property rights to open access
resources), indirect methods have to be found if we are to obtain notional prices for them. All
that said, there is no escaping the need for imagining the biosphere as a gigantic piece of natural
capital if we are to discuss the adverse environmental externalities accompanying births. We
denote the aggregate stock of the biosphere by K, a real number. K may alternatively be called
the global stock of natural capital.
A concrete way to imagine the biosphere is to focus on its biomass. In that case K,
measured in units of biomass, is the state variable of the biosphere. The composition of biomass
(grasslands differ from agricultural fields) is reflected in the aggregate measure K. Let K(t) be
the biomass at time t, and let F(K(t)) be the net output of biomass over a brief interval of time
(say, a year), starting at t. F(K) is a flow, or flux (so many units of biomass per year), whereas
K is a stock (so many units of biomass, period). Ecologists call F, "net primary production".
When the occasion demands, we will without loss of generality refer to F as "ecosystem
services".
To imagine the biosphere as a renewable natural resource requires facing a further
problem. Even two thousand years ago, when global population was under 250 million and per
capita income a bit over a dollar a day (Maddison, 2001), it would have been a reasonable
approximation to treat humanity as a separate entity from the biosphere. Today it is no longer
possible to do that. We are much engaged in transforming the biosphere, by both creating
biomass and destroying it. So we have to imagine humanity as being at the same time a
constituent of the biosphere and an entity that is separate from it. No doubt that's a stretch, but
it is possible to do it without running into contradictions. We avoid contradiction by noting that
a portion of F(K), say á, is needed for the maintenance of the biosphere. So, if over a period of
time F(K) was to be usurped entirely by humanity, K would shrink and biodiversity would be
reduced. If during an interval of time humanity was to consume even more than F(K), K would
       á is not a constant and is most likely a decreasing function of K.24
      A tractable form of F(K), in wide use among ecologists for a wide variety of ecosystems,25
is quadratic:
F(K) = rK(1 - K/K*), where r and K* are positive constants.
In this equation r is the "intrinsic growth rate" of K (because r at small values of K is the
percentage rate of growth of K) and K* is Earth's carrying capacity (because F(K*) = 0).
The view that the biosphere is a renewable natural resource covers pollution as well (e.g.
contemporary carbon emissions into the atmosphere). Pollutants are the reverse of natural
resources. One way to conceptualize pollution is to view it as the depreciation of capital assets.
Acid rains damage forests; carbon emissions into the atmosphere trap heat; industrial seepage
and discharge reduce water quality in streams and underground reservoirs; sulfur emissions
corrode structures and harm human health; and so on. The damage inflicted on each type of asset
(buildings, forests, the atmosphere, fisheries, human health) should be interpreted as
depreciation. For natural resources depreciation amounts to the difference between the aggregate
rate at which it is harvested and its natural regenerative rate; for pollutants the depreciation they
inflict on natural resources is the difference between the rate at which pollutants are discharged
into the resource-base and the rate at which the resource-base is able to neutralize it. The task
in either case is to estimate those depreciations. It follows that there is no reason to distinguish
the analytical structure of resource management problems from pollution management problems.
Roughly speaking, "resources" are "goods", while "pollutants" (the degrader of resources) are
"bads". Pollution is the reverse of conservation.
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shrink even more, further drawing down biodiversity. Humanity is doing that now, which is what
has led Wilson (2016) to propose that we should leave half the biosphere alone. (1-á)F(K) should
therefore be interpreted as the useable flow of biomass; useable, that is, by humanity.24
It could be thought that F(K) must be an increasing function of K for all values of K; but
that would be to overlook that Earth is finite in extent. F should therefore be taken to be an
increasing function of K for small values of K, but a declining function of K for large values of
K. Earth's "carrying capacity" for the prevailing life-forms (a formidable notion in itself, but one
that cannot be avoided) is that positive value of K at which F(K) is zero.25
7 Ecosystem Losses in the Anthropocene
Humanity's success in raising the standard of living over the past 250 years has involved
creating and then utilizing ideas and accumulating reproducible (or manufactured) capital and
human capital, while mining and degrading K. The socio-economic processes that drive the
production, dissemination, and use of ideas and the accumulation of reproducible and human
capital are at the heart of modern growth and development economics, but the decumulation of
natural capital has remained unrecognized (e.g. Helpman, 2004; Grossman et al., 2017). The
decumulation is also unrecorded in official economic statistics.
The bias is not a reflection of an indifference to the natural world, it is more a disconnect
between the social and environmental sciences. It is widely known for example that even while
industrial output increased by a multiple of 40 during the 20th century, the use of energy
increased by a multiple of 16 (contributing to climate change and degrading the oceans),
methane-producing cattle population grew in pace with human population (contributing to
      Carbon and sulphur dioxide emissions rose by a factor of more than 10.26
      The term "Anthropocene" was popularized by Crutzen and Stoermer (2000) to mark a new27
epoch that began with the Industrial Revolution some 250 years ago.
      The "hockey stick" graph refers to time series of mean global temperature over the p;ast28
2000 years. The variable remained more or less constant until the 20th century, when it displayed
a sharp increase (by approximately 1 Centigrade). The Anthropocene Working Group has
recently proposed that the immediate post-war years should be regarded as the start of the
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climate change and degrading the oceans), and fish catch increased by a multiple of 35 (reducing
stocks in the open seas).  Environmental scientists have found that the application of nitrogen26
to the terrestrial environment from the use of fertilizers, fossil fuels, and leguminous crops is
now at least as great as that from all natural sources combined. They have also found that soil
nitrogen and phosphorus inventories have doubled over the past century (nitrate levels in
Greenland ice are today higher than at any time in the previous 100,000 years), and that 25-30
per cent of some 130 billion metric tons of carbon harnessed annually by terrestrial
photosynthesis is now appropriated for human use (Vitousek et al., 1986, 1997; Haberl et al.,
2007). That signals the stupendous presence of a single species and helps to explain why
extinction rates of species since the early modern era have been far above background rates and
have increased a lot further since the 19th century (RSPB et al., 2013). These all point to rates
of biomass transformation in excess of the useable flux, (1-á)F. Consequently, they point to
reductions in K.
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005a-d) reported that 15 of the 24
ecosystems the authors had investigated world-wide are either degraded or are being exploited
at unsustainable rates. Population pressure on land and the habitat destruction that accompanies
human encroachment are the proximate causes. The figures put the scale of humanity's presence
on the planet in perspective and record that we are now Earth's dominant species (Ehrlich and
Ehrlich, 2008). The statistics also explain why our epoch has now been named the
Anthropocene.27
8 Net Demand on the Biosphere
Studying biogeochemical signatures over the past 11,000 years, Waters et al. (2016) have
provided a sketch of the human-induced evolution of soil nitrogen and phosphorus inventories
(more generally of polyaromatic hydrocarbons, polychlorinated byphenals, and pesticide
residues) in sediments and ice. The authors reported a sharp increase in the middle of the 20th
century in the inventories. Their work shows that the now-famous figure of the "hockey stick"
that characterises time series of mean global temperature also characterises a broad class of
geochemical signatures, and signal a sharp increase in the rate of deterioration of Earth's life
support system. Waters et al. (2016) proposed that mid-20th Century should be regarded as the
time we entered the Anthropocene.28
Anthropocene. See Vosen (2016).
      Q is also called "notional price" and more often, "shadow price". The literature on valuing29
natural capital is now huge (see for example, Freeman, 2003; Haque et al., 2011). There are now
a number of studies in which shadow prices of specific types of natural capital at the local level
have been estimated (water, air quality, woodlands, mangroves, coral reefs), but economic
demographers estimating the value of family planning programmes at the local level have not
made use of them.
In recent years costing the consequences of carbon emissions for the global climate has
been a major research topic. The basic idea is to estimate the net present value of the impact over
the next 100 years (or more) on, for example, agriculture from changes to the global climate that
are traceable to carbon emissions. That's Q, when restricted to the stock of carbon in the
atmosphere. The net present value has been found to be negative (meaning that global climate
change is expected to hurt the world economy; that is, the notional price of carbon is negative),
and has been estimated using a range of plausible figures for the rates at which future costs and
benefits are to be discounted. See Moore and Diaz (2015), who arrive at a figure of 220 US
dollars per ton of carbon emitted into the atmosphere. In contrast, the US Government uses a
figure of 37 dollars per ton. The wide difference in the estimates reflects differences in
assumptions regarding the effect of carbon emissions on the global climate and in turn the effect
of changes in the global climate on the fruits of human activities.
Bohn and Stuart (2015) offer various estimates of the social cost of carbon emissions
owing to a new birth (that's QÄK, but where K is restricted to carbon concentration and Q is the
shadow price of carbon in the atmosphere). In contrast, the literature contains next to nothing on
the valuation of changes that humanity is inflicting on the oceans and the biomass they harbour.
We do not know Q for the biosphere.
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Their reading is consistent with macroeconomic statistics. World population in 1950 was
2.5 billion. Global GDP was a bit over 7.5 trillion international dollars (at 2015 prices). The
average person in the world was poor, with an annual income of a bit over 3,000 international
dollars. Since then the world has prospered materially beyond recognition. Population has
increased to 7.4 billion and world output of final goods and services today is about 110 trillion
international dollars meaning that world income per capita now is about 15,000 international
dollars. A 15-fold increase in global output over a 65-year period helps to explain not only the
stresses to the Earth system that we have just reviewed, but also hints at the possibility (one that
we confirm below using crude data) that humanity's extraction of biomass has for some time
exceeded sustainable levels ((1-á)F). So, in addition to the direct benefits of family planning
programmes, which are currently assessed on the basis of the extent to which reproductive rights
are met, we should estimate the decline in reductions in K owing to a prevented birth and placing
a value on that reduction. If the reduction is estimated to be ÄK per prevented birth and the social
value of a unit of natural capital is Q, then the environmental benefits from a family planning
programme would be the product of QÄK and the number of births the programme is expected
to prevent.29
In the field of family planning nothing is simple. Addressing one problem simply leads
to several more. If Q remains largely un-estimated, determining ÄK from a prevented birth poses
problems for the demographer. Some family planning on the part of women involves delaying
      For pioneering work on the idea of ecological footprints, see Rees and Wackernagel (1994)30
and Rees (2001, 2006). See also Kitzes et al. (2008). Wakernagel, who founded the Global
Footprint Network (www.footprintnetwork.org/public), was a lead author of WWF (2008).
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births, not limiting numbers. Better spacing is a good in itself, but if numbers aren't affected, the
environmental consequences would be slight (ÄK would be negligible).
In a review of the state of the Earth's life support system, WWF (2012) reported that in
the early years of this century, humanity's demand for ecological services exceeded by 50 per
cent the rate at which the biosphere is able to supply those services to us. The figure is based on
the idea of "global ecological footprint", which is the surface area of biologically productive land
and sea needed to supply the resources a human population consumes (food, fibres, wood, water)
and to assimilate the waste it produces (materials, gases). The Global Footprint Network (GFN)
regularly updates their estimates of the global ecological footprint.  A footprint in excess of 130
means demand for ecological services exceeds their supply. GFN's most recent estimate is a
footprint of a bit over 1.6, which in our terminology means humanity has in recent years been
consuming ecological services at the rate 1.6(1-á)F(K). Humanity's demand for ecological
services can exceed supply for a period, but not indefinitely. Our model would interpret a
footprint in excess of 1 as a decline in K (i.e. ÄK < 0). Sustainable development would require
that the footprint over time must on average equal 1. To be sure, the entire function F(K) can be
made to increase by measures that reduce the footprint to less than 1. Advances in bio-
technology, for example, are designed to increase F(K). But the advances would be successful
only if they don't have large unintended adverse consequences on the biosphere. Moreover,
irreversible losses, arising say from biological extinctions (declines in K), would act as
constraints on the biosphere's ability to recover. Moves toward consumption and production
practices that make smaller demands on the biosphere would be a more direct approach to
reducing our impact on the Earth system. We return to those possibilities in Section 11.
The greatest contributors to the ecological-footprint overshoot are the OECD countries
(a club of rich nations). Estimating national footprints poses enormous conceptual and practical
difficulties. And without notional prices to guide us, it isn't possible to estimate the value of
environmental externalities associated with an average new birth. But for the global economy
the matter is less opaque because errors in measuring national footprints that arise on account
of trade in goods and services would cancel in the aggregate.
Assuming that the global ecological footprint is 1.6, we may conclude that to maintain
the current global average living standard at the prevailing distribution of income, we would
need 1.6 Earths. It is against this background that we offer a quantitative account of the adverse
environmental externalities humanity is inflicting on itself by allowing a substantial portion of
Nature's goods and services to be free. No doubt estimates of global ecological footprint are
very, very crude. Moreover, in contrast to estimates of such development indicators as GDP,
      The Daily-Ehrlich-Ehrlich study was based on the assumption that the sources of energy31
will continue to be fossil fuels. Today there is hope that energy will in due course altogether be
obtained from renewable resources. But that's still some ways ahead. Meanwhile K will have
been further depleted. And climate change is not the only source of stress to the Earth system.
Cohen (1995) collated a wide range of estimates that had been published in the past
century of Earth's capacity to support human numbers and their demands.
      The literature on reported happiness is huge. See Helliwell, Layard, and Sachs (2013) for32
a fine review of the large scale surveys that ask people to report their feelings and emotions and
collate their responses.
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population size, life expectancy, and literacy, which are made by a multitude of national and
global institutions, we are obliged here to rely on the estimates of a solitary research group
(albeit aided by a wide network of ecologists and environmental scientists). Nevertheless, that
there is an overshoot (ecological footprint in excess of 1) is entirely consistent with a wide range
of evidence on the state of the biosphere, some of which we have reviewed here. As the figures
are the only ones on offer, we make use of them.
9 How Many People Can Earth Support in Comfort?
Ecologists estimating sustainable world populations have sought to calculate the human
numbers Earth can support at a reasonable standard of living. In an important and interesting
paper Daily, Ehrlich, and Ehrlich (1994) studied the problem by quantifying the stresses to the
biosphere that are being caused by humanity's use of energy. The authors considered a rate of
energy consumption that would offer the average person options to pursue a wide variety of life's
projects and choices. In the early 1990s world population was 5.5 billion and global energy
consumption was an annual 13 terawatts (13 trillion watts). The authors took it as given that an
annual consumption of 13 terawatts of energy is unsustainable (it would play havoc with K). As
we now know from the on-going work of climate scientists, their presumption was right. The
authors noted the vast differences in energy use between the world's rich and poor, but on
assuming an equitable distribution of energy-use, they estimated that a population of 2 billion
(world population in the early 1930s) could enjoy a very comfortable life based on an annual 3
terawatts of energy consumption; and that a population of 1.5 billion (world population at the
start of the 20th century) could enjoy an even more comfortable life based on an annual 4.5
terawatts of energy consumption.31
The Daily-Ehrlich-Ehrlich estimates were a first cut on a neglected problem. An
alternative procedure is to identify a standard of living that can be justified on grounds that it
supports a high quality of life - we will identify one from surveys on "reported happiness" - and
ask how many people can be supported at that quality of life. We pursue that line of enquiry
here.32
An analysis of one set of global surveys on happiness and their relationship with
household incomes has revealed that in countries where per capita income is in excess of 20,000
      Layard (2011: 32-35) reports the finding and commends it. A number of explanations can33
be given for the finding, one being that what matters most to a household beyond a certain level
of income is its income relative to the average income in its peer group. Veblen (1899,[1925])
based his theory of the leisure class on this particular psychology of consumption. Veblen's
observation on human psychology found a telling expression in a remark attributed to a Garry
Feldman of Stamford, Connecticut, one of the wealthiest towns in the USA: "I might be in the
top one per cent, but I feel that I am in the bottom third of the people I know." (The Guardian,
Saturday 16 February 2013)
Another explanation for happiness saturation bases itself on the idea that people are
conformists even on styles of living. The problem isn't that either explanation is implausible
(they are both all too believable), but that either dominates all other factors affecting the demand
for goods and services beyond 20,000 international dollars. We use the figure only for
illustration.
      To convey an idea of 10,000 international dollars per person, it is the per capita income in34
contemporary Albania and Indonesia.
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international dollars, additional income is not statistically related to greater reported happiness.
We work with that figure, even though we are not at all sanguine we understand the finding.
20,000 international dollars is the per capita income in Panama, Mauritius, and Uruguay today,
and it is hard to imagine that happiness hits a roadblock at 20,000 dollars. On the other hand,
20,000 international dollars (at 2015 prices) was the per capita income in the early 1980s in
today's high-income countries. Were people there on average less happy then than they are now
(even when adjusting for increases in inequality since then)? So, for want of price estimates of
natural capital (Q), we follow the lead of studies on reported happiness.33
World income (or global GDP) today is about 110 trillion international dollars. Using 1.6
as the figure for the global ecological footprint today and assuming that the demand on
ecological products and services is proportional to GDP, we conclude that sustainable world
GDP is an annual 110 trillion/1.6 international dollars, that is, 70 trillion international dollars.
That level of global economic activity would be sustainable because K would not decline. If we
now regard 20,000 international dollars as the desired standard of living for the average person,
maximum sustainable population comes to 3.5 billion.
Notice how close this estimate is to the ones obtained by Daily, Ehrlich, and Ehrlich.
Each arrives at a global population under half of what it is today. That suggests, at least
tentatively, that the Earth system offers tight bounds on global population if a decent living
standard is to be sustained. World population was about 3 billion in the 1960s, so we are not
talking of unfamiliar figures. But suppose our goal was less demanding; suppose humanity would
be content with an average income of 10,000 international dollars, which is below the global per
capita income today.  Sustainable global population would then be 7 billion. As noted earlier,34
we are now 7.4 billion in numbers, moving toward a possible figure of 11 billion in year 2100.
And we haven't built into the analysis deep inequalities in living standards and the human
migration that are often a response to the distress that they give rise to. We turn to that now.
      See for example the regular commentaries in The Economist. The absolute poverty line is35
currently taken by the World Bank to be 1.90 international dollars a day. It is an adjustment to
the dollar-a-day figure that was introduced by the organization in the 1980s.
i      To confirm this suppose population size is N; people are indexed by i (= 1,2,...,N); and y36
iis person i's income. Let e  be i's demand for ecological services. A simple way to formulate the
assumed relationship between income and biomass consumption is
i ie  = Ay , where 0 < ð < 1 and A > 0 are constants.ð
Global demand for ecological services is then
i i i iE = 'e  = A['y ],ð
iwhere "'" denotes summation over i.
Suppose there is an increase in all incomes by g, expressed in percentages. Then the
global demand for ecological services (E*) would be
E* = (1+g) E < (1+g)E.ð
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10 Poverty and the Distribution of Global Income
By the Global Footprint Network's reckoning the world's ecological footprint in 1960 was
about 0.6. The figure suggests that humanity's reliance on the biosphere in 1960 was sustainable
and that the biosphere's composition was a lot different at that time from what it is now. World
population in 1960 was about 3 billion and per capita income approximately 4,500 international
dollars. These statistics are consistent with the finding that the Anthropocene is only a couple
of generations old (Waters et al., 2016).
Central to the UN's Sustainable Development Goals is the elimination of deep poverty
and reductions in global wealth inequality. How does the balance of rights change when we
cease talking exclusively in terms of global averages?
Most economists believe that success in reducing the proportion of the world's population
in absolute poverty from 37 per cent in 1990 to just over 10 per cent today can be traced to
strong growth in GDP that prominent developing countries have enjoyed since then (China and
India in particular) and the investment in health and education that was made possible by that
growth.  In international discourses it is today almost universally taken as given (e.g. Jamison35
et al., 2013) that eliminating absolute poverty and narrowing health disparities require robust
growth in GDP.
Related to poverty and the distribution of living standards is the question whether global
ecological footprint is proportional to world GDP. In our previous calculation we assumed the
answer is "yes" without comment. The assumption requires that household footprint is
proportional to household income; that is, the composition of household expenditure doesn't
matter to the biosphere. That is in all probability incorrect (Liu et al., 2003). So then consider
by way of example the case where ecological footprint increases less than proportionately with
income. If the distribution of income remains the same, growth in global GDP by g per cent
would be accompanied by a less than g per cent growth in the demand for ecological services.
And that's a good thing.36
But what if absolute poverty was to be eliminated by a redistribution of incomes toward
      To see why, we use the notation introduced in the previous footnote and consider the37
extreme case where there is complete equality of incomes following the redistribution. For
1 i Nvividness, label people so that y  < ... < y  < ... < y . Write the mean global income as y*. Then
i iy* = 'y /N. Suppose g = 0 (global GDP does not change). By assumption 0 < ð < 1. That means
i iNA(y*)  > A['y ]. But NA(y*)  is the global demand for ecological services under completeð ð ð
equality.
      To confirm, one could use the model in foonote 37, but assume ð > 1.38
      Landes (1998) is a classic on the subject.39
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greater equality? Such a policy has a strong appeal to egalitarian convictions. But policy makers
would be faced with a cruel dilemma: Even if average income was to remain the same, the
demand for ecological services would increase. That means improving the distribution of income
among today's contemporaries, a good thing in itself, would worsen the economic prospects of
future generations. There is a clash here between present and future rights.37
If ecological footprint increases more than proportionately with income, our conclusions
are reversed: Equalizing incomes among contemporaries would improve the economic prospects
of future generations, but a g% growth in global GDP would be accompanied by a more than g%
growth in the demand for ecological services.  Either way, the environmental consequences of38
growth and distribution point in opposite directions. That's another problem for the hapless
policy maker.
11 Dilemmas
The particular clash of rights we have identified in this paper arises from the fact that
much of the biosphere is treated as a free good. Imagine it were possible to establish
international agreements to charge people for the use of Nature's goods and services at rates that
reflect something like their social scarcity values. If that were to come about, environmental
externalities associated with consumption and reproduction would be eliminated, and policies
that speak to socially embedded preferences could be used to reduce further the demands we
make on Nature, perhaps even to the point where our demands are sustainable.
A further route to sustainable dependence on the biosphere is technological progress.
Economic historians of the Industrial Revolution point to the role institutions have played in
providing incentives to create the technological innovations that have been responsible for
reducing natural resource constraints.  But we can be sanguine about the character of39
technological advances only if natural capital is priced appropriately. Understandably,
entrepreneurs economize on the expensive factors of production, not the cheap ones. So long as
Nature's goods and services remain under-priced, technological advances can be expected to be
rapacious in their use. Moreover, technological advances that are patently good can have side-
effects that are not benign. The ability to use fossil-based energy at large scales has transformed
lives for the better, but it has created the unintended consequence of global climate change. Bull-
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dozers and chain-saws enable people to deforest land at rates that would have been unimaginable
250 years ago, and modern fishing technology devastate large swathes of sea beds in a manner
unthinkable in the past. If technological progress is our hope, it has to come allied with
elimination of environmental externalities.
The World Bank in its World Development Indicators 2016 reports that the 1.4 billion
people living in its list of high-income countries enjoy a per capita income of 40,700
international dollars. Thus, the richest 19 per cent of the world's population consume over 51
percent of world income (57 trillion/110 trillion). Assuming humanity's impact on the biosphere
is proportional to income, 51 per cent of that impact can be attributed to 19 per cent of world
population. If the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are to be met, consumption
patterns in these countries have to alter substantially. Our calculations in the previous section
suggest that, otherwise, efforts to shrink global income inequalities will prove to be
unsustainable. Consumption behaviour is influenced both by our urge to compete with others
(Veblen's "conspicuous consumption") and by our innate desire to conform. Each is a reflection
of socially embedded consumption preferences. As both drivers give rise to consumption
externalities, the psychological cost to a person of a collective reduction in consumption is likely
to be far less than what it would be if she were to reduce consumption unilaterally. The aggregate
cost could even be negative, especially if the working poor were less poor relative to the working
rich; as the former are far greater in number.
To see the numbers involved, recall that in Section 9 it was noted that an analysis of one
set of global surveys of "stated happiness" and their relationship with household incomes has
revealed that in countries where per capita income is in excess of 20,000 international dollars,
additional income is not statistically related to greater reported happiness. Imagine the 1.4 billion
people in today's high-income countries were to reduce their average consumption (or income)
to 20,000 international dollars. The drop of 20,700 (viz. 40,700-20,000) international dollars per
person in a population of 1.4 billion adds up to a total of 31 trillion international dollars. Other
things equal, world income would then be 79 (viz. 110-31) trillion international dollars, a figure
for global economic activity that is not far above the 70 trillion dollars we obtained (Section 9)
as a crude estimate for sustainable global income under present technologies and contemporary
social institutions.
But problems abound. According to the projections in UNPD (2015), world population
will increase from the current 7.4 billion to 11.2 billion in 2100. More than three-quarters of that
increase is projected to be in sub-Saharan Africa, from today's approximately 1 billion to 4
billion (Fig. 2). Per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa is currently 3,500 international dollars.
Comprising a little over 13 per cent of the world's population, the region represents a bit in
excess of 3 per cent of the world economy. So, sub-Saharan Africa cannot remotely be held
responsible for the global environmental problems we face today. But to raise incomes there
      Starbird, Norton, and Marcus (2016) contains a good discussion of this. 40
      We are grateful to John Bongaarts for correspondence on this.41
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even to the current global average income (15,000 international dollars) in the face of a 3-billion
rise in numbers would require an increase in the region's annual output from 3.5 trillion dollars
to 60 trillion dollars. That rise, assuming it is possible, will have severe consequences for the
region's ecology, contributing to further societal conflicts there and to greater attempts by people
to move both within the region and out of it. It is not difficult to imagine the international
tensions that scale of attempted movements would give rise to. The SDGs are largely silent on
population, and yet it is inconceivable that they can be met without addressing the subject.  Goal40
13, for example, recognizes that restricting the increase in mean global temperature to 2 C willo
require urgent collective action; but there is no acknowledgement that the target is unlikely to
be met unless population growth is reduced substantially (O'Neill, et al., 2010). The recent Paris
Agreement on climate change also made no mention of population.
If family planning programmes were intensified to meet unmet need everywhere in
Africa, population there would be some 1 billion smaller in 2100 than is currently projected by
UNPD (2015).  That itself would be a substantial gain for people in that region. But it would41
not be nearly enough. We have argued though that want based family planning, which is the
current norm, undervalues family planning. Greater investment in the service, bringing it into
alliance with other social programmes, could be expected to redce the projections further.
That fertility preference structures are socially embedded (be it conformist (Sect. 4) or
be it competitive as in the "wealth-in-people" thesis has it) offers hope to people of sub-Saharan
Africa that population growth there can be stemmed without much personal cost to people there.
That consumption preference structures are also socially embedded (and that includes the social
embeddedness that encourages competitive consumption, as in Veblen's theory of the demand
for status) offers hope to people everywhere that the environmental demands of the 1.4 billion
people in high income countries can be reduced without too much personal cost to people there.
For if relative consumption matters, a uniform reduction in consumption among all should be
expected to prove not too costly to people. The population-consumption-environment nexus is
one area of the human experience where the cost of necessary social change is probably a lot less
than is feared by social scientists.
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